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ESSLLI 2011 - Topics in Philosophy of Language
Lecture 5
are there novel forms of context-dependence?
Semantic relativism vs. contextualism
Isidora Stojanovic
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plan for today's lecture
- from "unarticulated constituents" to the contextualism/relativism debate
- time-relativity: the temporalism-eternalism debate, future contingents
- tentative ways of drawing the contextualism/relativism distinction
- applications to taste predicates, epistemic modals, gradable adjectives
- how to diagnose assessment-sensitivity vs. mere context-dependence
5.1: to be or not to be (… the value of a variable)  
the debate over unarticulated constituents
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What are unarticulated constituents?
Term introduced in Perry's Thought without representation 
(1986); for Perry, a constituent of a thought's content.
Idea: When I think to myself, 
"It's raining", my thought is 
about a certain place (its 
truth depends on the place 
where I am), but I do not 
need to articulate 
(=conceptually represent) 
the place in my though.
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Transposed into the realm of language, the debate was between 
François Recanati (for) and Jason Stanley (against); the debate 
is really a debate as to whether there are pragmatic processes 
that freely enrich truth-conditional (semantic) content, or not.
Stanley: when I say "It is raining", the location is articulated, 
because there is a variable in the logical form that picks out the 
place. Argument: the so-called Binding Argument:
If it is possible to apply a quantifier-like phrase to a sentence, 
there must be something in the sentence for the quantifier to 
bind. It is possible to say: "Wherever I go on holiday, it's raining". 
Ergo, the simple sentence "it's raining" must contain a location 
variable. 
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Is Stanley right?
More than one reason why one might be unhappy with the 
argument; but the most obvious one (for us) is that you can 
take 'it is raining' to be a sentence, and 'wherever I go' (and 
similar constructions) as a sentential adverbial (operator).
In other words, rather than posit a location variable, you 
would introduce a location parameter in the circumstances of 
evaluation; which is what Lewis & index-theorists did long ago.
A first connection with contextualism vs. relativism debate:
'It is raining' alone would express a content that is not true or 
false simpliciter, but is true relative to (i.e. as evaluated w.r. 
to) some locations, and false relative to others. Some take this 
to be a form of relativism (e.g. Lasersohn 2005 for taste). 
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Recanati: unarticulated constituents, free enrichment, and 
"truth-conditional pragmatics"
For 'It is raining', R. argued that the fact that there can be 
utterances of the sentence without having any specific place 
in mind shows that when you do refer to a specific location, it 
is optional hence an "unarticulated constituent".
R.'s scenario is far-fetched and (for many) unconvincing, but the 
idea of free enrichment, as opposed to mandatory pragmatic 
processes, is plausible enough. Some examples from contextualist 
literature: 
"This apple is red". vs. "This watermelon is red.",
"Mary walked over to the cliff and jumped". 
"You won't die" (to a person who mildly injured herself), etc.  
5.2 relativism with respect to time  
from temporalism to future contingents
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the contextualism / relativism debate in one glance
- follows up on the contextualism/literalism debate; note that the sense of 
'contextualism' can change from one debate to another 
- MacFarlane's proposal started with future contingents; but the current 
topics of predilection are: epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, 
and (to lesser extent) gradable adjectives and knowledge ascriptions  
- still a lot of controversy on how to draw the line between contextualism 
and relativism (cf. the case of “non-indexicalist contextualism”)
1st attempt: contextualism vs. relativism as a difference whether you 
take smth to be the value of a variable (or an implicit argument) or a 
value of some parameter in the circumstances of evaluation 
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Lewis on “schmentences”
Strictly speaking, we do not need to provide both context-
dependence and index-dependence. […] Schmentences would 
be akin to the open formulas that figure in the standard 
treatment of quantification. Truth of a schmentence at an 
index would be like satisfaction of a formula by an 
assignment of values. (1980, p. 33)   
Upshot: the work done by index-dependence can be done by 
the usual dependence on the assignment function. This would 
require that you view the expression 'there are dogs', as it 
occurs e.g. in 'It is possible that there are dogs' as distinct 
from 'There are dogs' tout court (assuming that the latter is 
closed and does not contain a free variable for the world). 
What goes into a circumstance of evaluation (or an index)?
David Lewis in “Index, Context and Content”
Often the truth of a sentence in a context depends on the 
truth of some related sentence when some feature of the 
original context is shifted. 'There have been dogs' is true now 
iff 'There are dogs' is true at some time before now. 
David Kaplan in “Demonstratives”
“By [possible circumstances of evaluation] I mean both 
actual and counterfactual situations with respect to which it 
is appropriate to ask for the extensions [and, in particular, a 
truth value] of a given well-formed expression.”
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More from Kaplan
“If we built the time of evaluation into the contents, it would 
make no sense to have temporal operators. To put the point 
another way, if what is said is thought of as incorporating 
reference to a specific time,... it is otiose to ask whether 
what is said would have been true at another time.”
The view that takes contents (or propositions) to vary in truth 
value with respect to time is temporalism (as opposed to 
eternalism) and is viewed by some as a form of relativism.
Temporalists: Arthur Prior, Michael Dummet 
Eternalists: G. Frege, Gareth Evans
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character (the most salient proximal place is the capital of Japon)
context:  Tokyo, August 2011 
content (Tokyo is the capital of Japan)




(14th century, actual w.)
This is the 
capital of Japan!
contextualist  (reductionist) vs. non-contextualist temporalism
On both approaches, contents can have different truth values 
wrt different times, but one approach works with the monadic 
notion of sentence-truth-in-context, and the other only with 
the dyadic notion of sentence-truth-in-context-at-time-t 
Contextualist temporalism (collapses the two parameters):
S is true in context c iff [[S]]M
c, t(c) 
=T, where t(c) is the time of c
Non-contextualist temporalism:  
S is true in context c, with respect to t, iff [[S]]M
c, t 
=T 
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In other words, a view that treats sensitivity to some feature f by 
introducting f as a parameter of evaluation (rather than a value 
of an indexical) is still contextualist if it endorses the idea that a 
sentence is true in a context iff it is true in that context as 
evaluated at the circumstances fixed by the context.
(That'd be what MacFarlane calls non-indexical contextualism.)
Note that a view such as Kaplan's, which is a temporalist view, is 
contextualist in this respect. Further, this distinction is related 
to the one between two notions of validity: S is valid iff S is true 
in every context (for which 'I am here now' is valid) vs. S is valid 
iff S is true in every context and w.r. to every circumstance  
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first observation:
- the variable vs. parameter of evaluation dispute is (arguably) 
not so interesting from a semantic point of view: what you can 
do with variables & quantifiers, you can do with (sufficiently 
sophisticated) indices & modal operators. Cf. results from modal 
logics (e.g. equivalence btw S5 and monadic predicate logic; e.g. 
Kuhn 1980 for general results; Stojanovic 2007 applies them to 
the case of Lasersohn 2005's proposal for taste predicates to 
argue that, from a purely semantic standpoint, the choice btw an 
implicit argument vs. a taste parameter can't be well motivated) 
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second observation:
- the quantificational vs. tense-logical treatment of tenses and 
temporal expressions in natural language is still alive (e.g. Jeff 
King 2003); but regardless of that, there seems to be a problem 
with non-contextualist temporalism:
If I say now, "I am sitting", and I stand up, the truth that I express 
doesn't thereby turn into a falsehood. 
A very different kind of time-relativity arises with future 
contingents compare with: "Tonight I will be sitting."  
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history-relativism for future contingents 
(Belnap & al. 2001 – Facing the Future)
Truth is defined for context-history pairs:
'It will be p' is true in context c
 
and history h, if there is time later 
than c on history h at which p is true
'It is settled that p' is true in context c is 'It will be p' is true at 
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assessment-relativism for future contingents 
(MacFarlane 2003)




iff (for p temporally specific)
p is true at every point m/h where m=the time of c
U
 and h is a 







From “standard” relativism to assessment-relativism
Standard relativism (e.g. Lasersohn):




S is true in context-of-utt. c at context of assessment k iff 
[[S]]M












s are context-of-utterance-sensitive 
parameters (e.g. world, location) and p
i
s are assessment-sensitive. 
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5.3 
contextualism vs. relativism
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what we have noted so far
- literalism, on the one hand, and contextualism and relativism, on the 
other, yield different predictions of truth valued; but contextualism & 
relativism, suitably construed, yield the same truth value predictions
- even in the contextualism/relativism debate, there aren't two well-
delineated positions, but rather, several different issues that thereby 
give rise to several positions, some of which can equally well be 
classified as contextulist or as relativist, depending on one's criteria 
what we are going to examine next
- whether there are any well-designed tests to decide what kind of 
treatment can be best applied to a given expression
- we'll start by looking at some examples, to get a sense of the debate
Knowledge Attributions
contextualism: the truth value of the report depends on the context: 
it's false in a context with high standards (e.g. under discussion of 
the possibility of a brain in a vat), and true in an ordinary context.
relativism: even if uttered in a context with low standards, the report 
can be false if re-evaluated from a context with high standards
Isidora knows that the 
bus is going to town.
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Predicates of personal taste
contextualism: 
the truth value depends on a contextually specified agent/group
relativism:
the truth value depends on the “judge”, i.e. the person who assesses 
or evaluates the claim, and on their taste
This stew is 
delicious.
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Is contextualism about a given parameter p the view that a given 
value for p is part of what is said (by utterances sensitive to p)? 
"The contextualist takes the subjectivity of a discourse to consist in the 
fact that it is covertly about the speaker (or perhaps a larger group 
picked out by the speaker's context and intentions). Thus, in saying 
that apples are "delicious", the speaker says, in effect, that apples taste 
good to her (or to those in her group)" (MacFarlane 2006: 18).
"On this view, 'It's wrong to cheat' involves ellipsis, or a place holder 
indicating a set of standards, a code, whatever. What [its] use says 
depends on what has been elided or what is being assigned to the place 
holder.” (Richard 2008: 89).  
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In Egan et al. (2005), contextualism is similarly understood as a view that 
models the relevant parameter p upon the implicit arguments associated 
with 'local' and 'nearby' or with gradable adjectives ('old' and 'slow'). The 
emphasis, in their objections to contextualism, is on reported discourse:
1) Mary (in Bloomington): “The local bars are awful.”
1') (in Paris): “Mary is saying that the local bars are awful.”   
2) Mary (ignorant of where John is): “He might be in Prague.”
2') (John, in Paris): “Mary is saying that I might be in Prague.”   
The main problem for this sort of argument is that the data from 
reports of what is said are tricky and complicated. 
Also, nothing commits to the view that the location value (viz. the place to 
which the bars are local) is part of what is said. Furthermore, (1') itself is 
ambiguous; though it is true that (2') lack the same sort of ambiguity. 
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Disquotation in reported discourse
Take a sentence S with the expression that we are testing for (but fix the 
remainder of the sentence in such a way that it becomes context-insensitive). 
Let S be uttered by speaker A in context c, and consider the sentence "A said 
that S" uttered in an arbitrary context c'. The expression isn't assessment-
sensitive if there are contexts in which the report is false.
how to distinguish assessment-sensitivity 
from other forms of context-dependence?
tentative tests showing (lack of) assessment-sensitivity
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Disquotation in reported discourse: some examples
1. John (from camp A): The ennemies will attack.
(In camp B): John says that the ennemies will attack. ambiguous
(in camp B): John says that the allies will attack.
2. John: This stew is delicious.
John says that this stew is delicious. ok
NB: success at the test needn't mean that it is assessment-sensitive 
- for it can simply be insensitive.
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Invariance with respect to what is said
Take a sentence containing the expression that we are testing for (again, fix 
the remainder so that it is context-insensitive), and let the sentence be uttered 
by speaker A in context c and by speaker A' in context c'. The expression isn't 
assessment-sensitive the test if there are contexts in which the report "A and 
A' said the same thing" is false (and not ambiguous). 





This stew is 
delicious.
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Retrospective reassessment (present-tensed and past-tensed)
Let S be a sentence containing the expression that we are testing for 
(but keep the remainder context-insensitive) and suppose that, uttered 
at time t, it has truth value v. The expression is assessment-sensitive 
i) if there is a later time t' at which the sentence “That is (now) false”, as 
uttered in reference to the utterance of S that was made at t, also has 
truth value v; 
ii) if  there is a later time t' at which the sentence “That was (then) false” 
(or “I was wrong”) as uttered in reference to the utterance of S that was 
made at t, also has truth value v.
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example for retrospective assessment
Mary might 
be in Paris.
...John learns that 
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Third-party reassessment
Suppose that sentence S (containing the expression tested for), as uttered by 
speaker A, has truth value v. The expression is assessment-sensitive if it is 
possible that the sentence “That's false”, as uttered by speaker B in reference 
to A's utterance of S, has also truth value v.
Mary might 
be in Paris. He's wrong.
That's false.
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Deniability
Let a sentence be uttered by speaker A, and let speaker B reply to A: 
“No, that's not the case.” Then the expression is assessment-sensitive 
if the felicity of such a dialogue is compatible with A's and B's 
utterances having the same truth value.
This stew is 
delicious.
No, it isn't.
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Final remark: Deniability ≠ Faultless Disagreement
This stew is 
delicious.
No, it isn't.
defenders of faultless disagreement (Kölbel, Richard, Lasersohn):
- If John finds the stew delicious, he's saying something true.
- If Ken doesn't find it delicious, he too is saying something true.
- Boris and Jean are competent speakers who understand each other.
- Boris and Jean disagree, and they do so rationally.
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That's it!
*
Thank you for attendance
For any remaining questions,
don't hesitate to contact me:
isidora.stojanovic@ens.fr
